The moral obligation

Dear Editor:

Despite its length, Douglas Lyon’s reply did not deal with my chief contention: that though he assumed that the only way to understand the clause in the Constitution which gives the federal government the power of ‘providing for the general welfare’ is by referring to the founders’ “original intent”, there is at least one other principle of interpretation employed by constitutional scholars and political bodies: namely what such a phrase might reasonably be held to cover today.

Mr. Lyons holds that any principle other than “original intent” involves a “reinterpretation” of the Constitution. That means he still assumes that the principle he favors is the correct one and that anything else involves violation of an obvious truth.  That simply fails to recognize that he himself has an interpretative principle, that there are others, and that we can argue about which is the best way of understanding the Constitution. Merely assuming that his is the only way does not provide an argument in its favor.

Note:  Mr. Lyons spends much time complaining that I omitted the words “of the United States.”  I did, but he cannot get a conservative interpretative theory out of those words.  The reference to the United States is a reminder that our government is not required to seek the general welfare of all the nations of the world nor are we to restrict our concern for well-being to only, say, the citizens of the state of Virginia.

Such programs as Social Security and Medicare are not unconstitutional because not conceived of by the founders of the nation.  “Providing for the general welfare” of all of us is a moral ideal embedded in the document that provides for the structure of our government and our lives. We need to try to live up to what that ideal requires (think health insurance for every citizen.)

Merrill Ring
Claremont